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Industry 4.0 in the contemporary operating context carries important sources of complexity.This context generates both traditional
risks and emerging risks that must be managed. The management of these risks includes both industrial risks and occupational
risks, since they are heavily interlinked. The human factor can be considered the main link between both types of risks. Thus,
understanding risks originating from human errors and organizational weaknesses as causes of accidents and other disruptions
in complex systems requires elaborating sophisticated modeling approaches. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to propose
an organizational and human performance approach to improve the emerging risk management linked to the complex systems,
like as Human-Machine Interactions (HMI) and Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). To fulfill this objective, we first introduce the
concept of emerging risk linked to human factor.Then, we introduce the concept of emerging risk management in the Industry 4.0
context. Under this complex context, we expose the concept considering the currentmodels of riskmanagement. Finally, we discuss
how enhancing human and organizational performance can be achieved through risk management in complex systems linked to
Industry 4.0.Therefore, we conclude that while Industry 4.0 brings numerous advantages, it must contend with emerging risks and
challenges associated with organizational and human factors. These emerging risks include industrial risks as well as occupational
risks. Moreover, the human factor aspect of Industry 4.0 is directly linked to industrial emerging and occupational emerging via
context of operations. To cope with these new challenges, it is necessary to develop new approaches. One of such approaches is
Complex SystemGovernance.This approach is discussed along with the need for adequate organizational and human performance
models dealing with, for example, experience from other domains such as nuclear, space, aviation, and petrochemical.
1. Introduction
The concept “Industry 4.0” has its origin in a “strategic initia-
tive” of the German government in 2011 [1]. In its simplest
form, this concept is a name given to the current trend of
automation and data exchange in manufacturing technolo-
gies. Industry 4.0 encompasses elements of cyber-physical
systems (CPS), Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing,
and cognitive computing [2]. Industry 4.0 and its synonyms,
such as Smart Manufacturing, Smart Production, Internet
of Things, or the 4th Industrial Revolution [3], have been
identified as major contributors in the context of digital and
automatedmanufacturing environment [4]. Kagermann et al.
[1] note that such concepts are linked to smartmanufacturing
systems configured with digital networking of production. In
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addition, the concept “advanced manufacturing” is related to
a greater interval of industrial modernization. The scientific
interest around these terms is clearly increasing during the
last years [5].
In contrast to conventional forecast based production
planning, Industry 4.0 enables real-time planning of pro-
duction plans as well as dynamic self-optimisation [6].
The productive model based on Industry 4.0, in addition
to improving processes in terms of efficiency and quality,
can help improve safety as well as sustainability and the
industry image [7]. However, industrial processes configured
for advanced manufacturing processes and technologies can
increase levels of complexity of production processes and
introduce high dynamism into processes creating the so-
called smart working environments [8, 9]. Taking the context
of critical infrastructures as a reference, Zio [10] suggests
that the industrial processes under the Industry 4.0 paradigm
can be considered complex, made up of many components
interacting in a network structure. These components can
be physical and cyber-physical, functioning heterogeneously,
organized in a hierarchy of subsystems, and contributing to
system as a whole.
However, there is scarcity of literature discussing issue of
complexity in the context of Industry 4.0. Table 1 is developed
to support this thesis.Thefirst scientific publications emerged
in 2012. Thereafter, there has been increased interest in the
concept of Industry 4.0.
In relation to enterprise production and operation, Indus-
try 4.0 has four objectives [11]: environmental sustainability,
safety, agility, and high efficiency. It has been suggested that
Industry 4.0 environment will lead to a new revolution in the
domains of safetymanagement practiceswith “out of the box”
thinking [4]. However, this suggests that the management of
those organizations brings new challenges given significant
uncertainties associated with increasing complexity [12].
Suffice to say that traditional industry has its own
problems. When these problems are coupled with emerging
paradigmof Industry 4.0 alongwith emerging complex, there
emerges a need for development of rigorous and sophisti-
cated approaches for risk management (i.e., traditional and
emerging risk management). Roig and Brocal [13] suggest
management of emerging risks through combination of
different approaches to provide more enlightened decision-
making.
Interestingly, despite an increase in number of scientific
publications on the subject of “Industry 4.0” (Table 1) the
number of publications addressing “risk” and “Industry
4.0” is very low. Table 2 highlights this concern with the
following search in “Web of Science” (search standards used
in Tables 1–3; the results are null for the following queries:
TS=(“Industry 4.0” and “risk management”); TS=(“Industry
4.0” “emerging risk”)).
The management of these emerging risks includes both
industrial risks and occupational risks, since they are heavily
linked [14]. The human factor can be considered the main
link between both types of risks. In such cases, concepts
of Human-Machine Interactions (HMI), Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI), and Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) can
be considered among the most important [4, 7, 15]. In an
Table 1: Number of scientific publications on complexity and
Industry 4.0 (Results from theWeb of Science. Timespan: 2010-2018;
All databases; Field tag: Topic).
Year Complexity Industry 4.0 Industry 4.0 andcomplexity
2018 70810 1555 69
2017 73548 1136 63
2016 82644 561 48
2015 67325 191 9
2014 59552 69 4
2013 55519 23 3
2012 51013 4 0
2011 48151 0 0
2010 46884 0 0
equivalent way to the results shown in Table 2, the number
of scientific publications that integrate the concepts Industry
4.0, safety, and occupational safety is still very scarce, as
shown in Table 3. In this way, Badri et al. [8] indicate that
published research on the integration of occupational health
and safety (OH&S) in the Industry 4.0 context is rarely
cited.
Thus, understanding risks originating from human errors
and organizational weaknesses as causes of accidents and
other disruptions in complex systems requires elaborating
sophisticated modeling approaches. Therefore, the objective
of the present research is to define an approach for organiza-
tional and human performance that can be used to improve
the emerging riskmanagement linked to the complex systems
under paradigm of Industry 4.0. To obtain this objective, the
rest of this paper is organized as follows:
(i) Section 2 introduces the concept of emerging risk
linked to human factor in Industry 4.0 context.
(ii) Section 3 introduces the concept of emerging risk
management in the Industry 4.0 context. Under this
complex context, authors expose the concept consid-
ering the current models of risk management.
(iii) Section 4 is organized to provide ways to improve
organizational performance with the goal of improv-
ing safety in the complex systems linked to Industry
4.0
2. Emerging Risks
The definitions and risk models used in the professional and
scientific fields are numerous. In this regard, Aven [16] has
made a classification of definitions on risk most commonly
used. Said author considers that the definitions collected in
Table 4 are the most relevant. Aven [16] argues that the
definition or model (3) is the most appropriate.
From a standardized perspective, ISO 31000:2018 stan-
dard indicates that a risk is usually expressed in terms
of risk sources, potential events, their consequences, and
their likelihood [20]. In OH&S field, the ISO 45001:2018
standard defines an OH&S risk (the terms “OH&S risk” and
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Table 2: Number of scientific publications on risk and emerging risk in the Industry 4.0 (Results from the Web of Science. Timespan: 2010-
2018; All databases; Field tag: Topic).
Year Risk Risk management Industry 4.0 and risk Emerging risk Management and emerging risk
2018 335.842 7155 66 84 19
2017 324.537 8226 55 88 21
2016 310.952 7762 27 90 17
2015 289.990 7210 7 71 19
2014 265.015 6461 1 81 20
2013 247.840 6173 0 74 17
2012 224.108 5884 0 66 16
2011 207.076 6050 0 62 14
2010 193.041 6092 0 79 11
Table 3: Number of scientific publications on safety and occupational safety in the Industry 4.0 (Results from theWeb of Science. Timespan:
2010-2018; All databases; Field tag: Topic).
Year Safety Industry and safety Industry 4.0 and safety Occupational safety Industry 4.0 and occupational safety
2018 291.426 13.270 81 1940 7
2017 262.601 14.352 58 2248 7
2016 246.359 11.658 23 1858 1
2015 228.041 11.239 7 1536 1
2014 216.289 10.651 3 1606 0
2013 182.296 10.390 1 1596 0
2012 154.996 9.189 0 1690 0
2011 124.767 8.616 0 1343 0
2010 109.836 7.259 0 1229 0
“occupational risks” are used as equivalent in this paper) as
the combination of the likelihood of occurrence of a work-
related hazardous event or exposure (s) and the severity of
injury and ill health that can be caused by the event or
exposure(s) [21]. These definitions are among the models on
risk collected in Table 4, highlighting the adaptation ofmodel
(2) to the definition of occupational risk.
The application of these definitions and models needs
adaptations and new approacheswhen dealingwith emerging
risks, which are discussed in the following sections.
2.1. Emerging Risk Concept. Generally, when the term
“emerging risk” is mentioned, this term refers to any risk
that is new and/or increasing. However, other perspectives
do exist. For example, the International Risk Governance
Council [22, 23] suggests that emerging risk should be viewed
from a “systemic” perspective. A systemic perspective of risk
includes both (i) emerging and (ii) new conditions. First,
the risk is emerging when it is new in a broad sense, as,
for example, in the case of new technologies, new materials,
etc. Second, the risk is emerging when being familiar or
traditional; it is presented under new or unfamiliar condi-
tions (e.g., the reemergence of the poliovirus). In both cases,
uncertainty is the main characteristic of emerging risk [24].
From this perspective, the emerging risk adapts especially
well to model (4) (R=U). However, the IRGC [24] notes
that this uncertainty is related to the probabilities and/or
consequences of the emerging risk. In this way, model (2)
would also be applicable.
Brocal et al. [17] have proposed a theoretical framework
through which the new and emerging risk (NER) concept
has been modeled, especially in industrial processes.The risk
model used as a reference is the following: a risk (R) is a
structure consisting of five components: the source of risk
(SR), causes (C), events (E), consequences (CO), and the
likelihood (L); this set may be expressed as (8):
(8) R = (SR,C,E,CO, L)
From this framework, Brocal et al. [25] have developed
TICHNER (Technique to Identify and Characterize NERs)
technique that aims to identify and characterize the NERs
generated by a manufacturing system. TICHNER is based in
the definition of NER considered in the reports published
by EU-OSHA [26–29]. This definition has been codified by
Brocal et al. [17] through the so-called conditions that define
an NER (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, and C6), which are collected in
Table 5.
Given that aNER is any risk that is new and/or increasing,
Brocal et al. [17] consider that a risk is new (NR, new risk)
when it can be associated with conditions C1, C2, and C3.
Considering model (8), condition C1 is linked to new SR
and new C. The novel aspect can be both technological and
organizational. C2 andC3 are linked to new SR, C, E, andCO.
In this case, the novel aspect of C2 is associated with changes
in social perceptions and the novel aspect of condition C3 to
new scientific knowledge about risk. These authors consider
that a risk is increasing (IR, increasing risk) when it can
be associated with conditions C4, C5, and C6. Condition
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Table 4: Main models on risk used in the professional and scientific fields (adapted from [16]).
Model Description
(1) R=E Risk=Expected value (loss)
(2) R=P&C Risk=Probability and scenarios/Consequences/severity of consequences
(3) R=C&U Risk=Consequences/damage/severity of these + Uncertainty
(4) R=U Risk=Uncertainty
(5) R=OU Risk=Objective Uncertainty
(6) R=C Risk=Event or consequence
(7) R=ISO Risk=Event or consequence
Table 5: Possible combinations between the Ci conditions and the risk components (model (8)) that can form a NER: NR and/or IR (adapted
from [17]).
Conditions Risk Components (model 8)Source of Risk
(SR)
Causes
(C)
Events
(E)
Consequences
(CO)
Likelihood
(L)
NEW
C1: New technological or
organizational variable (SR,C1) (C,C1) — — —
C2: New social perception (SR,C2) (C,C2) (E,C2) (CO,C2) —
C3: New scientific knowledge (SR,C3) (C,C3) (E,C3) (CO,C3) —
INCREASING
C4: Increase in the number of
sources of risk (SR,C4) — — — —
C5: Increase in the likelihood of
exposure — — — — (L,C5)
C6: Increase health consequences — — — (CO,C6) —
C4 is linked to the increase of SR, C5 to the increase of L
(exposure level and/or the number of people exposed), and
C6 to the increase of CO (seriousness of health effects and/or
the number of people affected).
Considering the above aspects, Table 5 shows the different
possible combinations between the Ci conditions and the risk
components that can form an NER (NR and/or IR). Thus,
depending on the combination in each case of interest, that
is, the characterization of emerging risk according to Brocal
et al. [25], the risk could be analyzed with one of the models
in Table 4.
The terms “new and emerging risks (NERs)” and
“emerging risks” are used as equivalent in this paper. How-
ever, some significant differences can be found in the tech-
nical and scientific literature. These differences, according
to Brocal [30] and Cantonnet et al. [31], point at a clear
problem of consensus on terminology and interpretation
around emerging risk. The works of Brocal et al. [17, 25]
propose approaches and models to reduce the associated
uncertainty.
It would be desirable that the terminology regarding these
risks (i.e., “new and emerging risks,” “emerging risks”) is
standardized. In this case, the CWA 16649: 2013 document
may prove to be the first step. Currently, International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) is developing the ISO
31050 standard—Guidance for managing emerging risks to
enhance resilience [32].
2.2. Emerging Risks Linked to Human Factor. The effects of
Industry 4.0 on OH&S generate advantages and drawbacks
that could generate emerging risks [8]. These emerging risks
include both industrial risks and occupational risks, since
they are heavily related [14]. Arguably, human factor is the
main link between industrial emerging risks and occupa-
tional emerging risks in advanced manufacturing processes.
This may as well be the case, given the complexity of opera-
tional and the shifting business environment that continues
to overwhelm human cognitive capacities [8, 33–37].
Consequently, one often tries to use mental and intellec-
tual “shortcuts” in finding “easy” explanations or solutions
taking into account directly visible parts of the whole context
only.The complexity ofmodern systems generates the opacity
where some significant risks become systemic and may be
well hidden and lurking beneath until conditions reunite for
their full display. One of direct consequences of those changes
is the nature of the risks which continue to occur. While
undesirable events such as industrial accidents, process and
supply chain disruptions, or bankruptcies formerly occurred
from known causes and factors, contemporary events usually
originate from unanticipated interactions between elements
with no visible links [12, 38–40]. In tightly connected complex
systems and their environment, it creates conditions for
cascading events throughout them [10, 38, 41–49] due to
increased interdependencies [50, 51]. Several authors argue
that analyzing the performance of complex systems should
also imply a careful examination of low level events as well as
organizational factors such as safety culture and the incentive
system, which shape human performance and affect the risk
of errors [37, 39, 52–56].
2.3. Emerging Risks Linked to Complex Systems. The techno-
logical evolution, including the introduction of the concept
of Industry 4.0, and the contemporary operating context
significantly contribute to increasing complexity [12]. Some
authors categorize it as a “structural complexity” issued from
the heterogeneity of system components across different
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technological domains. It is a result of increased integra-
tion of various technological systems. There is also the
“dynamic complexity” which is revealed by an emergent
(usually unanticipated) system behavior as a reaction to
local perturbations and stimuli in its environment [10]. For
example, the integration of modern technologies and new
control rules (Industry 4.0) creates additional opacity in
systems.
In this regard, concepts such as Human-Machine Inter-
actions (HMI) and Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) can
be considered among the most important [4, 7, 15]. HMI
and HRI can be considered sources of risk (SR). From this
perspective, Brocal et al. [25] have applied the TICHNER in
order to identify and characterize emerging risks linked to
HMI andHRI.These risks are heavily linked to conditions C1,
C4, and C5. In this regard, tasks that involve human control
of automated equipment are increasing [57], including the
expansion of HRI [58]. With the increase and development
of the cobots, these emerging risks are evolving towards
scenarios with greater uncertainty, due to (i) the greater
flexibility and mobility of the cobots as well as their greater
interaction with the workers [8, 57] and (ii) the challenge of
increasing the sophistication of the tasks carried out by this
type of robots [58].
The increase of this intelligent equipment can lead to
connecting the causes of human error with the “smart
machine error” [8]. Likewise, the increase in the number
of degrees of freedom of the robots also increases their
complexity, increasing the risk of entrapment and the dif-
ficulty for humans to predict their movements [15]. As the
manufacturing tasks become more individualized and more
flexible, the machines in smart factory are required to do
variable tasks collaboratively without reprogramming [59].
The reliability of such devices is more difficult to predict as
the complexity of these systems increases [8].
Brocal et al. [5] have classified the above emerging risks
into two groups, in light of their consequences (CO): acci-
dents risks and psychosocial and musculoskeletal risks. The
accidents risks in automated environments are closely linked
by human errors [60]. Among other causes, it highlights
human monitoring and control of processes through control
systems, instead of direct control [61], which can lead to a
reduction of the practical knowledge of the process [62] and
therefore result in over-reliance on automated safety systems
[60]. In relation to psychosocial risks and musculoskeletal
risks, they can be studied independently or jointly, since
they are interrelated, especially in automated contexts. In
these contexts, considering the work of Flaspo¨ler et al. [60],
the main interrelated causes (C) are low physical activity;
static postures; high mental workload, for example, during
the monitoring and control of the processes indicated by
Chidambaram [61]; reduced privacy at work (mainly because
new technologies allow closer and more intrusive supervi-
sion); and increase of problems in decision-making.
3. Emerging Risk Management
The increase in organizational complexity in manufactur-
ing processes is changing from centralized decision-making
towards decentralized instances. In decentralized instances,
decision-making can be taken by workers or by equipment
where artificial intelligence is integrated [57]. This increase
in the complexity of Industry 4.0 affects the OH&S especially
in terms of work content, management, and other organiza-
tional factors [8].
Based on the work of Brocal et al. [5], risk management
systems in the context of Industry 4.0 can be classified into
four hierarchically interrelated types: risk governance, risk
management, OH&Smanagement system, and emerging risk
management. The main models, according to this classifica-
tion, are discussed in the following section below.
3.1. RiskManagementModels. From a global level, IRGC [63]
proposes a framework for risk governance. This framework
provides a guide for the design and application of comprehen-
sive assessment andmanagement strategies to deal with these
risks. SRA [64] defines risk governance as the application
of governance principles to the identification, assessment,
management, and communication of risk. Thus, the process
of risk management may be considered integrated into the
overall process of risk governance.
In relation to risk management, ISO 31000:2018 standard
provides guidelines and a common approach to managing
any type of risk. This standard defines risk management as
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization
with regard to risk. SRA [64] defines risk management as
those activities to handle risk such as prevention, mitigation,
adaptation, or sharing.
In OH&S field, the ISO 45001:2018 standard defines
management system as a set or interrelated or interacting
elements of an organization to establish policies and objec-
tives and processes to achieve those objectives; and OH&S
management system is a management system or part of a
management system used to achieve the OH&S policy.
3.2. Emerging Risk Management Models. IRGC [65]
addresses emerging risks linked to technology and industrial
processes.Themethodological aspects for early identification
and management of emerging risks are described by the
IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance [24]. These
methodological aspects are flexible and adaptable, especially
in complex and uncertain contexts [24].
The IRGC [24] has reviewed emerging risk governance
frameworks, and it has selected five:
(i) ENISA: European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security
(ii) EFSA: European Food Safety Authority
(iii) Swiss Re SONAR system
(iv) Dutch framework (emerging risks related to the use
of chemicals)
(v) CEN workshop agreement (CWA) 16649:2013
(emerging risks related to technology)
CWA 16649:2013 proposes the Emerging Risk Management
Framework (ERMF). The whole process is based on the
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concept that emerging risks go through a maturation pro-
cess [24]. This ERMF is based on the risk management
frameworks defined by IRGC [63] and ISO 31000: 2009.
Currently, International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) is developing the ISO 31050 standard—Guidance for
managing emerging risks to enhance resilience [32].This new
standard has taken CWA 16649: 2013 as one of its references
[66].
4. Ways to Improve Organizational
Performance to Improve Safety in
the Complex Systems
As discussed above, the introduction of the concept of
Industry 4.0 brings numerous advantages, but also some new
issues. It includes, among other things, emerging risks related
to rising complexity of technological systems.One has limited
knowledge upon them due to lack of long-term observation
data. This situation is fairly challenging for management,
organizations, and individual workers as a whole.
This section presents a discussion on how to enhance
human and organizational performance aiming at improving
risk management in complex systems linked to Industry 4.0.
4.1. Challenges Related to Organizational and Human Per-
formance. Komljenovic et al. [12] provide a comprehen-
sive review of research works regarding organizational and
human performance in analysis of industrial accidents where
complexities, systemic risks as well as organizational and
human performance, are seriously involved.
A constant deviation toward danger or failure seems to
be one of their key characteristics. The latter is practically
impossible to grasp in traditional of chain-of-event analyses.
All this requires overcoming the traditional static
approach to risk, through the development of dynamic risk
management models oriented towards the organizational
and human performance, which is strongly linked to the
complex systems characteristic of Industry 4.0.
4.1.1. Dynamic Management. Industry 4.0 provides digital
management of operations in new technological devices,
improves working conditions, and generates a safe manufac-
turing environment for workers [4, 8]. In this way, this tech-
nological development allows the integration of advanced
safety systems. Among them, the use of Virtual Reality (VR)
stands out to create a risk-free virtual learning and training
environment, applications for the use with mobile devices
or wearable computing, and the use of RFID technology
[7]. Among the main applications of RFID technology is the
Workforce Management and the Enhancing Safety, which
allows, for example, real-time control of access to dangerous
areas, as well as emergencies [67].
In the work environment of Industry 4.0, a wide range
of examples of smart materials, smart personal protective
equipment, and other advances technological applications is
improving the OSH [9]. Such context production workers
provide immediate feedback of production conditions via
real-time data through their own smart phones and tablets
[6]. In this context, the safety management is one of the
most important issues [7], where Podgorski et al. [9] have
proposed a framework based on new dynamic risk manage-
ment paradigm. In this way, one of the challenges of Industry
4.0 is the difficulty of managing dynamic risk, as well as the
availability and presence of experts in OSH [8].
Thus, during the last few years, new approaches and
methodologies have been developed for risk assessment
and management considering the dynamic evolution of risk
[68]. The main objective of the dynamic risk assessment is
to provide an estimate of the risk over time that reflects
the current condition of the system, considering for it the
integration of the effective aggregation of heterogeneous
information [69].
4.1.2. Organizational Performance. It seems that the under-
standing of events is changing given that one of the main
sources of risks (SR) nowadays is the organization [12].
Majority of undesirable events (E) has essentially organiza-
tional components. One considers “organizational” factors
that understand a collective behavior (e.g., centralization and
decentralization and organizational clarity).These character-
istics come from the evolution of two factors: (i) the category
of fences (physical or nonphysical) insuring a safe operating
environment and (ii) the new couplings between factors that
were formerly nearly independent. The latter is even pushed
further with Industry 4.0.
Barriers that allow normal operation progressed with
both the complication of work and the more involved per-
sons. Therefore, this new context complicates the detection
of flaws in these barriers, leading to undesirable events and
failures. Such situations bring degradation of operational and
safety margins. They may be locally and individually accept-
able, but the sum of effectsmay have important unanticipated
consequences that are not captured by a local analysis.
The complexity of the operating environment involves a
solution at the organizational level in order to cope with new
challenges [12, 34, 39, 45, 70–74].
There are also studies investigating the hypothesis that
modern enterprises depend on the deployment of cognitive
capacities [70]. The authors argue that there are severe
limitations on these capacities in a phenomenon they identify
as “functional stupidity.” “Functional stupidity” represents a
lack of critical thinking, a deliberate condition of ignorance
evading defiance to the status quo. This type of pathology
is usually widespread in settings ruled by economy in
persuading [75, 76]. Such a situation may lead to types
of administration curbing or marginalizing suspicion and
suppress effective communications. On the other hand, this
context brings a structure of interior discussions in such ways
favoring positive storylines and marginalizing undesirable
ones. Thus, those situations may lead to reducing capacities
of the innovation and creativity creating more fragile organi-
zational structures that are vulnerable to both internal and
external threats and perturbations, particularly in complex
modern enterprises.
4.1.3. Human Performance. The behavior of people is basi-
cally shaped by their milieu. Marais et al. [77] analyze
situations where one does not always anticipate inadequate
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behavior. It seems that autonomous decisions across organi-
zation may lead to unexpected combination with harmful,
often surprising, impacts on both the performance and safety.
Additionally, Katina [75, 78] using a synthesis of literature
suggests that decision-making and actions are influences
by norms and personal attitudes, organizational structures,
knowledge base, and social context, degree of connectivity,
race and ethnicity, mass media, and national ideology. This
suggests a need for consideration of cognition, system,
and environment as well as their interplay. Furthermore, a
tangible reduction of undesirable events, such as accidents,
major process interruptions, or bankruptcies, involves a deep
understanding of human and organizational performance
issues.
Some research works propose the framework of complex-
ity leadership theory which may help getting a better human
and organizational performance [79, 80].
As far as the rationality of decision-making is concerned,
several research works indicate that one cannot assume that
it is always rational [12, 35, 72]. Cognitive and motivational
biases are usually part of the decision-making process. Cog-
nitive bias is defined as “a systematic discrepancy between
the “correct” answer in a judgmental task, initiated through
a formal normative rule, and the decision maker’s actual
response to such a task.” Motivational biases describe a
distortion in decision-making regarding outcomes, results, or
choices [72]. Those biases usually have a negative impact on
the wanted outcomes and performance of organizations.
4.1.4. Complex Systems. The complexity and the opacity of
modern systems bring difficulties to the staff to predict
its overall behavior as a function of its individual compo-
nents. The complexity is a system property and results from
interactions between its components/subsystems, humans,
HMI, HRI, etc. It generates unanticipated and emergent
comportment of the system, often intensified by ill adapted
operator’s actions to those situations.
HRI can be a paradigmatic industrial and occupational
example of this complex and challenging context, where
Vasic and Billard [15] propose the design of new sensing
technology and of fast sensor fusion algorithms (i) to track
multiple moving targets in real time, (ii) to achieve robust
detection of human motion in order to build good predictive
systems, (iii) to ensure robust detection of contact between
robots and surrounding living agents in multiple points, and
(iv) to develop fast responsive controllers that can replant
trajectories in complex, cluttered environment in real time.
Several research works highlight the importance of
detecting and cautiously analyzing warning flags, precursors,
near-misses, and “low-level” events in order to avoid system
level break-downs, process interruptions, and/or major acci-
dents. Therefore, organization should have enough organiza-
tional, economic, and technological resilience and flexibility
applicable in a large number of different and (un)anticipated
situations [12, 36, 37, 39, 55, 81].
As far as humanperformance is concerned, it is important
to understand the error itself. Some research works have
shown that both success and failure pathways apply the same
intellectual processes, and only the consequence changes. So,
the undesired outcome qualifies an action as an error, and it is
essential to find its cause. Analyses shall find out why an event
occurred (“direct cause” related to preventive and mitigating
barriers as well as error precursors) and why it was not
stopped (“fundamental cause”). It also has to investigate the
organization and its performance (expanded fundamental
causes). Considering that it is almost impossible to determine
a true causality in complex systems, those analyses become
a difficult undertaking in a modern industrial setting. Stock
and Seliger [57] propose approaches to address the human
factor and social change in Industry 4.0. For this, these
authors propose through new technologies increasing the
efficiency of the training of the workers, as well as increasing
their intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
4.2. Potential Approaches for ImprovingHumanandOrganiza-
tional Performance. As discussed above, the introduction of
the concept of Industry 4.0 brings numerous challenges. To
cope with those new challenges, it is necessary to implement
both a systematic return of experience (internal and external)
and a continuous improvement process and to increase orga-
nizational resilience and robustness to unexpected events.
However, increasing resilience shall be thought about wisely
in order to preserve competiveness, further development,
sustainability, and economic viability of an organization.
The organizational resilience is a developing concept.
It will not be discussed in detail here, but there are some
suggested references upon the topic [10, 34, 45, 70, 71, 82–
84].This section presents suggestions regarding key elements
which may reinforce the organizational resilience in the
context of Industry 4.0.
4.2.1. Modeling and Measuring Human and Organizational
Performance. Understanding impacts and risks of humans
and organizations as contributors to mishaps, disruptions,
and accidents in complex systems requires an adequate
model. The model has to go further than the “simple”
approach of linearly analyzing preventive and mitigating
barriers, which provides quite narrow insights of the events.
Although some models exist [12, 39, 52, 53], these models
are not necessarily adaptive to the context of Industry 4.0
risks. Therefore, suggesting the development of methods
which will enable modeling and measuring human and
organizational performance in the context of Industry 4.0 is
a novel approach.
In this regard, it is necessary to adequately take account
of the complexity of today’s organizations as well as their
operating context. This complexity necessitates a new way
of reasoning andmanaging contemporary organizations.The
traditional approaches in modeling, analyzing, and manage-
ment are not entirely adequate to do it, and new methods are
necessary [12, 36].
Actually, there are numerous research works suggesting
that contemporary organizations should be considered, ana-
lyzed, modeled, and managed as Complex Adaptive Systems
(CAS) or Complex Adaptive Systems of Systems (CASoS)
[12, 36, 73, 85]. This claim is particularly relevant with the
introduction of the concept of Industry 4.0.The theory of the
complexity and characteristics of CASoS are not discussed
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Figure 1: CSG metasystem functions (modified from [19]).
here in detail. It is suggested to consult relevant references on
the topic [10, 12, 36, 40, 43, 45, 49, 71, 74, 86, 87].
4.2.2. Adaptation and Introduction of the Concept of Com-
plex System Governance (CSG) for Industry 4.0. A possi-
ble approach for dealing with complexity in organizational
setting is the application of emerging research of Complex
System Governance. Complex System Governance is an
emerging field, representing an approach to improve system
performance through purposeful execution of design for and
evolution of important metasystem roles [19, 88–90]. In this
emerging field of CSG, the main roles include evolving and
improving system performance essential functions enabling
control, communication, coordination, and integration [19].
Figure 1 is based on the research of Keating et al. [19] and
provides the overall description of the SG approach (Table 6
provides elaboration of the different functions in the CSG
model as suggested byKeating and Bradley’s [18] research). In
CSG, the “metasystem” is deliberately used to imply functions
and roles beyond the purview of individual systems in the
“system of systems” cluster [91–93]. In Table 6, individual
systems can be represented as M1. However, M1 is not listed
as the concern for CSG is as the control and communication
beyond individual systems (i.e., the metasystem level).
Keating and Bradley [18] provide the systemic represen-
tation of CSG indicated in Table 6 in which the purpose
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is to provide an organizing construct for the interrelated
functions necessary to perform CSG. In CSG approach, the
center of any systemic intervention is people with their
strengths and weaknesses. In essence, this is recognition that
design, execution, and evolution of a systemic intervention
are accomplished by people. As such, people become the
central driving force behind systemic intervention includ-
ing challenges related to machine-human interfaces. The
effectiveness in intervention must be a function of those
who design, conduct, and have participatory roles in the
intervention effort [94].The CSG approach includes a system
mapping followed by an investigation to uncover causes of
weaknesses (i.e., pathologies) in the governance structure.
Pathology acts inhibiting system performance. While CSG
is focused on functions enabling viability of the system, it
also calls for systemic identification and assessment of system
pathologies affecting governance [75]. Interestingly, present
research suggests that solutions in the CSG paradigm might
involve going beyond technology “fixes” to include “socio”
policy, context, and environment.
Pyne et al. [85] further explore concepts, methods, and
tools thatmay helpmanagers to cope with constantly increas-
ing complexity issues. Furthermore, it is suggested that
effective problem solving in complex domains (i.e., Industry
4.0) may need different level of “more systemic” approaches
capable of matching the uncertain, complex, and dynamic
behavior characterize today’s industries. Proponents of CSG
approach suggest exploring the challenges inmoving theCSG
from the theoretical/conceptual formulation to practice.
A potential area of practice is Industry 4.0. Again,
if one takes Industry 4.0 to mean the current trend of
automation and data exchange in manufacturing technolo-
gies and encompassing CPS, IoT, cloud computing, and
cognitive computing, there remains a case to be made for
the utility of CSG in the various areas of Industry 4.0.
At the onset, it appears CSG might be used to address
issues related to themes of viability, governance, control,
communication, coordination, and integration, as well as
malfunctions (pathology) that may emerge in the different
facets of Industry 4.0.
4.2.3. Benefiting from Experience of Other Industries at Risk.
Main industries at risk such as nuclear, space, aviation, and
petrochemical have developed different ways of coping with
human and organizational performance issues. Their return
of experiencemay be beneficial for analyzingways to improve
it within the context of Industry 4.0. Some experience and
practices from the nuclear power industry are depicted below.
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) iden-
tifies key aspects to accomplish the quality in the integrated
riskmanagement [81]. Some attributes are enumerated below:
(i) Behaviors: the expected actions for the stages of
risk management are suggested for all organizational
levels from individuals to corporate executives.
(ii) Organizational characteristics for effective integrated
risk management: a set of principles, policies, prac-
tices, oversight, and training are recommended for
achieving an all-inclusive risk management process
which is elaborated and implemented.
(iii) Integrated risk management warning flags: the warn-
ing flags aim at helping the staff and managers to
detect undesirable conditions affecting an integrated
risk management. The former are categorized by
defenses aiming at minimizing risky events. The staff
and managers should analyze them for stimulating
discussions and draw lessons.
Such an approach may help reinforcing the overall resilience
and robustness. This activity also involves a cautious analysis
of organizational factors such as incentive systems that influ-
ence human performance and impact the risk of errors [37].
This feature is also termed “Antifragility” by some researchers
[42, 95]. The antifragility puts forward an idea of adaptive
organizations with regard to complex and continuously
altering internal and external operating context. In this case,
one can suggest that internal and external complexification is
also partly due to the introduction of the concept of Industry
4.0 which sometimes may overwhelm human capacity to
grasp relevant factors in acting and decision-making. This
implies that the paradigm of “only” technological solutions
to emerging risks may be misleading especially without
consideration of role of the human and organizational factor.
For example, one becomes inclined to more risk taking
by putting undue confidence into the technology without
knowing its limits and vulnerabilities.
Therefore, improving andmanaging human performance
risks (including those coming from machine-human inter-
faces) based on the experience from the nuclear power indus-
try may also include other elements such as the following
[48]:
(i) Frequently discuss risks, complexity, and their inter-
dependence
(ii) Perform gap analysis between outlooks and observa-
tions of behavior
(iii) Enthusiastically lobby different opinion to avoid
deliberate carelessness (reduce cognitive and motiva-
tional biases)
(iv) Analyze and discuss past behaviors, including infor-
mal messages at the corporate level
(v) Doubt and uncertainty should not go unchallenged
(vi) Ask to demonstrate that a system is appropriately safe
to function or not sufficiently unsafe to be shut down
(vii) Be cautious regarding findings from a root cause
investigation that one points out to the negligence; in
this case, only part of the story has been exposed
(viii) Enlarge the scope of defense-in-depth concept to
embrace the concept of complex systems and their
intrinsic nonlinearity
5. Conclusions
Undoubtedly, Industry 4.0 brings numerous advantages.
However, this paradigm also carries emerging risks and
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challenges related to organizational and human performance.
These emerging risks include both industrial risks and
occupational risks. Arguably, human factor is the main
link between industrial emerging risks and occupational
emerging risks in the Industry 4.0 context.
Addressing these issues calls for effectiveness in dealing
with traditional static approach to risk, for example, through
the development of dynamic risk management models ori-
ented towards the organizational and human performance.
However, there is also a need to develop robust approaches
capable of dealing with emerging risks associated with Indus-
try 4.0. In this research, Complex System Governance is
suggested.
However, there remains a need for case applications,
clearly articulating the potential of such approaches. More-
over, there is no need to be limited to such approaches as
Complex System Governance. This research can be extended
to include technological approaches such as Blockchain
Technology and the discovery of deep systemic pathological
issues affecting Industry 4.0.
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